Lois Fulmer Bray Smith v. Lynn W. Bray : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Lois Fulmer Bray Smith v. Lynn W. Bray : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson B. Howard; Howard & Lewis; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Smith v. Bray, No. 9253 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3669
In the Supre01e Court of the 
State of Utfi I L E 0 
II:! 7- 1960 
...... " 
LOIS FULMER BRAY SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
CASE 
vs. NO. 9a2S q ~ :) ~ 
LYNN W. BRAY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
Jackson B. Howard, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
... -'f ......... ____ _ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
STATEMENT O·F POINTS......................... 2 
ARGUMENT ..................................... 3 
CASES CITED 
Larsen vs. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P2d 596. . . . . . . . 3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
LOIS FULMER BRAY SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LYNN W. BRAY, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action were divorced on the 27th 
day of February, 1945, and the court entered a judgment 
against rthe defendant requiring him to pay $60.00 per month 
for the support of his minor children. The defendant did 
support the children until the latter part of 1946 or the first 
part of 1947 (Tr. 7). From that time on the defendant has 
paid the plaintiff nothing for the support of the children, 
except $30.00 which was paid in February of 1959 m re-
sponse to a letter from the plaintiff's attorney immediately 
prior to the filing of this action. 
The defendant states that the reason he did nort pay 
plaintiff support money as required by the decree is that 
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she told him that her husband was going to adopt the chil-
dren (Tr. 10 & 21) and that they both told him to stay away 
from the home and that she and MT. Smith would support 
the children. 
Mr. Bray contacted Mrs. Smith occasionally to inquire 
about the children but was always told nort to interfere or 
that he would get her in trouble (Tr. 26). The defendant 
saw the ehildren on one occasion, a fishing trip in 1953 (Tr. 
27). It was Mr. Bray's testimony that Mrs. Smith never 
requested any payment from him, nor demanded any pay-
ment from him. 
The children have, since 1946, gone by the name of 
Smith; they have been registered in school by the name of 
Smith, and have had little or no contact with their father. 
The only correspondence between the parties has been a 
Christmas card at Christmas time (Tr. 24, L. 12). 
It was not until the spring of 1959 that Mrs. Smith made 
any demand upon the defendant and then she had her at-
torney write him a letter setting forthe the amount of his 
indebtedness to her. Subsequently, this action was filed to 
collect $9,860.00 in accrued support money. Mrs. Smith 
explained to the court that the only reason the action was 
commenced was that they (Mr. and Mrs. Smith) had some 
financial reverses, or otherwise they would not have brought 
the action (Tr. 15, L. 2-10). 
STATEl'IENT OF POINTS 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY OF LACHES IN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF HER RIGHTS UNDER THE 
DECREE REFERRED TO IN HER PETITION AND 
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THAT SHE WAS ESTO·PPED AND BARRED FROM RE-
COVERING ON THJIS DELINQUENCY. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN F AIUNG TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY O~F LACHES IN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF HER RIGHTS UNDER THE 
DECREE REFERRED TO IN HER PETITION AND 
THAT SHE WAS ESTOPPED AND BARRED FROM RE-
COVERING ON TH[S DELINQUEN·CY. 
It is the position of the defendant rthat the facts in this 
case are identical in every material particular with the case 
of Larsen vs. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P2d 596. In .that 
case the court concluded that there were sufficient facts 
and evidence from which the trial court could reasonably 
find that the respondent (defendant) in that case was barred 
from recovering her sought for judgment. Our analysis 
of the two situations is as follows: 
In the Larsen case Darwin W. Larsen, the appellant 
therein, obtained a divorce from VaLene P. Larsen and 
the court awarded to her, the mother, $35.00 per month for 
the support of the child. The appellant in that case ·had 
not made payments for the support of the child since June 
of 1947. The respondent remarried shortly after the di-
vorce above referred to and the appellant therein, Mr. Lar-
sen claimed that Mrs. Larsen had told him that her hus-
band would support the child and that all she wanted from 
the appellant was that he should refrain from seeing her 
or the child. Mrs. Larsen in that case said that she ·had 
not refused payments for the support of the child and tes-
tified that none had been offered to her by the appellant, 
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although she admitted she had never asked or tried to col-
lect any of the payments. The evidence also disclosed that 
the child had taken the name of her stepfather when she 
attended school. 
It is our position that the facts in this case are iden-
tical. The Court will note that the parties were divorced 
in 1946, that they both remarried, and that the defendant 
here had not made payments since the fall of 1946 or the 
spring of 1947 (Tr. 7). In the instant case the court or-
dered payments of $30.00 per child, or $60.00 per month, 
as compared to $35.00 per child in the Larsen case. In this 
case the appellant did not make payments to the plaintiff 
for reason that S'he told him she did not want him to make 
payments to her (Tr. 29). She told him that his calls were 
interfering with her marriage (Tr. 27), and that she would 
prefer that he stay away from her home. She further told 
him that ·her ·husband was going to adopt the children (Tr. 
10) and her husband confirmed that fact (Tr. 21). The 
children went by the name of Smith and had done so for at 
least ten years (Tr. 17) ·and probably twelve years (Tr. 11). 
Some material excerpts from the transcript are as follows: 
Concerning Mrs. Smith's demand for money (Tr. 7): 
"Q. (By Mr. Howard) Have you? 
A. I have made no demand. 
Q. That is right. 
A. I have expected, but I have made no demand. 
Q. Nor have you filed an action to reduce this to 
judgment, have you? 
A. No." 
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Concerning the proposed adoption of the children by 
Mr. Smith (Tr. 10): 
"Q. (By Mr. Howard) Isn't it a fact, Mrs. Smith, 
that you told him your husband was going to adopt 
the children? 
A. Yes." 
And the children have gone by the name of Smith (Tr. 
11) = 
"Q. Mrs. Smith, you have had these children go 
by the name of "Smith" for twelve years, haven't you? 
MR. IVINS: I will object to that as being imma-
terial. 
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained. 
(Argument was had.) 
MR. IVINS: I can't see where it would be a fac-
tor. 
MR. HOWARD: It would show her attitude to-
ward the children. She treated them as her children 
of her second husband, not as 'her first. 
THE WITNESS: He accepted them as his chil-
dren. 
MR. HOWARD: Your husband did? 
A. Surely he did. Wouldn't any man? 
MR. HOWARD: That is the point I am getting at. 
THE COURT: Well, I rthink she has answered the 
question. She had them go by the name of Smith." 
( Tr. 17, L. 16) : 
"What name do they go by? 
A. From the second grade on, David and Danny 
go by the name of "Smith." 
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(Tr. 17, L. 24): 
"Q. (By Mr. Howard) How old are the children? 
A. David is seventeen and Danny nine." 
That the children were well taken care of (Tr. 17): 
"Up until last year your husband had always been 
able to support and maintain these children adequartely, 
had he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they have been well taken care, have they 
not? 
A. Yes." 
The only reason Mrs. Smith brQught this action was 
because of Mr. Smith's financial reverses (Tr. 15, L. 8): 
"Q. But if it hadn't been for financial reverses, you 
never would have started this action? 
A. That is right." 
Mr. Bray testified as to why he ·has not paid anything 
for the ·children, which testimony substantially reflects the 
facts (Tr. 29, L. 19): 
"Q. (By Mr. Hloward) Mr. Bray, why is it you 
haven't paid any support for these children? 
A. Because I was told not to. 
MR. IVINS: Because why? 
A. Because they said they would take care of 
them on their own. 
Q. (By Mr. Howard) I believe you stated that 
you were told not to, is that right? 
A. That is right. That they didn't want anything 
from me. 
Q. Is there any other reason, or is that the sole 
reason? 
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A. Well, the last while I haven't been in a po-
si tion to send support. 
Q. But you have relied upon their statements, I 
suppose? 
A. Yes." 
His above statement in court is almost identical to his 
February 14, 1959, reply to Mr. Ivins' letter (Pltf. Ex. 1), 
\Vhich is as follows: 
Heber Grant Ivins 
Geneva Finance Building 
American Fork, Utah 
Dear Sir: 
"50 Lorraine Avenue 
Pittsburg, California 
February 14, 1959 
vVe received your letter a little late because of the 
wrong address and the people who got it held it for a 
few days. We were really taken for a loss when we 
read it. We were up there in January and saw Mrs. 
Smith at that time. She made no mention of this sub-
ject. However, we will try to eX!plain why she has re-
ceived no payment since she was married. 
In the first place she and her husband let us know 
that they wanted to raise the boys as their own. They 
made the boys take the name of Smith and every time 
we would send them a persent they seemed to give us 
the impression it wasn't wanted. We have been to Utah 
several times in the last 7 years and at no time was 
the mention of the support mentioned, so we just natu-
rally thought they were satisfied to raise them on their 
own. The last time I tried to contact the boys was Oc-
tober, 1957. At that time I was told over the phone 
not to call again. so I have not even as much as asked 
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about them since that time as I didn't want to cause 
any trouble to anyone. 
I am very sorry that Mrs. Smith didn't say any-
thing in January as it would have saved ·her the need to 
trouble you as I know we could have worked something 
out. We are not able to pay the back money but I am 
sure we can work out something for the future. 
HQping to hear from you I remain, 
Sincerely, 
/s/ Lynn Bray" 
It is the position of the appellant that this case is in 
point in almost every particular with Larsen vs. Larsen and 
that the rationale as applicable in Larsen vs. Larsen is ap-
plicable in this case. We quote to the Court its finding and 
language in the Larsen case: 
"(1) A reading m the cases cited in support of the 
above quoted statement discloses that relief to the fa-
ther of a minor from such support money judgment 
depends on the view of the court determining the case 
as to what is equitable under the circumstances. We 
conclude that the evidence is sufficient from which the 
trial court could reasonably find facts which wo.uld 
sut)port a holding that the respondent is barred from 
recovering a part of this judgment for back support 
money on the grounds which the above quotation caJls 
laches or acquiescence but which actually appear to 
rest on equitable estoppel. We are sending the case 
back to n1ake findings on those issues for we conclude 
the evidence is sufficient to support findings either way. 
The court nmy make such findings from the evidence 
already received or the court in its discretion may al-
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. low the parties to· reopen the case and introduce addi-
tional evidence on such questions." 
"(3) If the child has been the beneficiary of equiva-
lent support and education so that the mother is en-
titled rto receive all of said past due support money, 
she should be free to release, compromise or waive that 
which is hers. But if the child has been provided bare 
shelter and food, and denied the benefit of proper 
clothes and dental and medical care, then the mother 
should not be free to waive that portion of past due 
support money that the child has not received. The 
authorities cited above hold that this doctrine is ap-
plicable to this extent. It is the prerogative of the trial 
court to determine these facts and if he finds that facts 
exist to justify equitable estopel, he should apply that 
doctrine and relieve the father from payment of the in-
stallments to the extent indicated. Of course, as to 
future payments, there is no question but what she is 
entitled to collect from the time she ·made demand, and 
appellant does not dispute this. He has been making 
such ayments since her demand for them." 
The distinction between the Larsen case and the Bray 
case is that in this instance the defendant has ·not been dis-
honest in his conduct toward the plaintiff, nor has ·he de-
frauded her or the government, as the dissent so wittily 
observed in the Larsen case. Furthermore, the period of 
laches has been four years longer in the instant case than 
in the Larsen case, which should strengthen the position 
of the appellant here. 
This matter being so closely in point to the Larsen ·case 
and the Court having before it the authorities for the Lar-
sen case, as set forth in the Court's opinion on page 226, 
the appellant rests his case thereon. This being an equity 
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matter, the transcript being but 36 pages in length, the 
appellant respectfully requests the Court to read the entire 
transcript and there to judge the facts for itself. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J aekson B. Howard, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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